C F Knight's Great War Memoirs

This preface is a very personal one, and is written with the advantage of the perspective of nearly eighty years since the battle took place. The writer also has the advantage of same knowledge of British Army culture, having experienced active service (but of a very different kind) over thirty years later in Palestine and North Africa. The writer also has a 'feel' far the middle class establishment social attitudes of that period, having been taught by school masters who were above the age far military service during the First World War and who were brought back from retirement to teach during the Second World War. Much of the atmosphere of the battle is echoed in CFK's account, which of its nature is very individual and traumatic. It is a pity that he does not mention the company of the 2nd battalion in which he served, that would have pinpointed the location of his experiences more closely.
Only one significant fact in CFK's account contradicts the official account. Officially the KRRC relieved the French at the end of June/beginning of July. He indicated that he crossed the Yser canal on the night of 4th - 5th July and went up the line to relieve the Jocks. This may well have been a local arrangement, having been kept in reserve for a couple of days. However this can be explained by the exigencies of active service when in battle. In those circumstances, resources are drawn from anywhere and the Jacks may have been a small detachment brought in to fill a gap or do a particular job. How was he to know who else was in the front line, he was new to this position and, after all, rather preoccupied with his first experiences of trench warfare.
Looking at the battle in the perspective of history, it shows the grim 'logic' of all out war. In July 1917 the Russians had not yet collapsed, Germany was in need of a 'victory' for propaganda purposes, however limited. Trench warfare had proved to be a costly stalemate. The extreme western end of the front line had one variation, the proximity of the sea, beach and adjoining sand dune terrain. This was coupled with weak British defences inherited very recently from the French - the trenches were not reinforced with concrete and therefore would easily collapse under heavy bombardment. These were in advance of the Yser canal, a natural defensive barrier, with vulnerable communications to the front and between different battalions, the neighbouring Regiment and the adjoining Division.
The Germans used these factors to win a violent but local battle. They laid down an intense barrage of shelling with many heavy calibre howitzers. These destroyed trenches and dugouts, created a 'dust storm', rendered rifles and machine guns useless and kept the defender's heads down under the little cover they could find. The British artillery had not been brought up in any quantity to counter this barrage at that time. The Germans, using marines, then attacked by coming round the British left flank along the beach at low tide, while still shelling the battlefield proper, as well as attacking on the front, and surprised the defenders by out-flanking them. The result was inevitable, despite many individual acts of heroism. The British losses were enormous.
It is also interesting to observe the style of writing adopted by CFK and to same extent the official account. This showed the influence of 'The Boys' Own Paper' - 'stiff upper lip' under privations and making light of traumatic experiences with puerile comments. This was coupled with the official attitude to the devastating losses, patriotically resigned to the suffering of men at the front and their families at home and relying an 'revenge' on a future occasion to put the matter right.

A SUMMARY OF THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT.
From the 'Kings Royal Rifle Corps, 1917, 2nd Battalion', by John Hurray. with a more detailed account by Lt Col. Lewis Butler KRRC, then a Captain, who took part in the battle and escaped back to the British lines.
Before the battle the 2nd battalion of the KRRC had been 'reconstituted' (largely replaced with new men) four times since the beginning of the war, owing to heavy losses.
The whole of April was occupied in training in various methods of attack, on the last day of that month, the battalion moved to the Peronne area for work on the railway. On the 27 May the battalion moved to Bailleul and continued training. June was a very quiet month spent at Meteren. July began badly, Brig-Gen Hulback and Brigade Major Calthorp were wounded inspecting trenches at Niewport Bains.
The front bordering the sea was taken over from the French. On 4th July the sector immediately adjoining the sea was occupied by the 1st Division on a front of 1,400 yards. The 2nd Brigade being in advance with the 2nd KRRC on the left and the Northamptonshire Regiment on the right. These battalions were positioned beyond the Yser facing due east posted on a line of sandhills running north-south about 600 yards east of the Yser. The terrain was sand dunes - varying from soft, marshy, to hard. The remaining 2 battalions of 2nd Brigade were the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment positioned on the left and Royal Sussex on the right in and around Niewport Bains west of the Yser. At the rear of 2nd Brigade was the remainder of 1st Division. (Brig Gen Kemp took over command of 1st Division in lieu of the wounded Brig Gen Hulback). On the immediate right of 1st division was the 32nd Division in and around Lombardtzyde, the Geleide a confluent of the Yser separating the two divisions. A single bridge over the Geleide was the only connection between the two.
The Yser a canalised tidal river was spanned by three floating bridges close together near its entrance to the sea. The banks were formed by stone revetments and the river varied between 60-100 yards wide.
The trenches taken over from the French were 'sketchy', and in the absence of concrete afforded little protection. Only 'unremitting vigilant support of powerful artillery fire and the closest co-operation between aerial and military forces were essential if the position were to be tenable for even a few hours. Yet the heavy artillery had been temporarily required elsewhere', apart from a few howitzers west of the Yser. Strong support had been promised. The French and the Belgians before them, aware of the weakness of the position, did nothing to attract attention, or raise alarm among the enemy. British commanders were to keep quiet, yet they were also ordered to make raids on enemy entrenchments. Improvements to communications between troops on either side of the Yser were not completed. Existing bridges could be destroyed by determined bombardment. No rafts or boats were moored.
The four companies of the 2nd KRRC were positioned as shown on the Niewport Bains map. The Northants Regiment was positioned to the right of the KRRC. The underground tunnel noted on the left flank, to connect Battalion HQ and dressing station with the front, was incomplete. Assistance of enfilade fire from RN gunboats off the coast was hoped for, but naval orders showed that these were not to be used for the fear of endangering our own troops with misdirected fire.

Hardly had some 600 riflemen taken up their new positions when German artillery began to fire along the whole line on the night of 9-10 July, causing some 70 casualties. 'A' Company suffered 25 casualties and was relieved by 'C' Company (exchanged) A raid made on enemy entrenchments on the night of 9-10 July by an officer and 20 men was 'successful' , but shells wounded 9 men and killed the prisoner who was brought back. (If this is the same raid as that described in CFK's account - 15 men on the same night making a raid to capture a prisoner, then CFK was a member of 'B' Company.)
Two officers, one the from Northants Regiment and one gun officer, attached to the battalion were immured in their dugouts. The two battalions (KRRC and Northants) were to be relieved after dark on the 10th, but at 8.30am the barrage (including heavy calibre shells) was intense and continued until 1pm. This fire was not confined to the front line but searched out supporting battalions and Brigade HQ beyond the Yser.
Bombardment continued without intermission. Telephone wires had been cut from the front line and with the artillery beyond the Yser. Messages had to be delivered by hand or by pigeons (8) - some reached their destinations. News came back to Battalion HQ of the effects of the bombardment. (Lt Col Abadie commanded the battalion from Battalion HQ) During the afternoon 'B' Company HQ was blown in. The ground was torn by shells, sand rose in clouds, blinding men, and rendering rifles and machine guns useless. Our artillery was not strong enough to keep down enemy fire. German aeroplanes swarmed over the lines at a height of 60 feet, machine gunning trenches. No allied planes appeared.
Everybody felt that assistance was at hand, but hours passed and the bombardment continued, trenches were blown in, men entombed in dugouts, but no aid arrived. Battalion HQ received two direct hits, wounding several officers. These were left in the nearby dressing station. The HQ moved to the unfinished tunnel. This was already occupied by 40 men of the Australian Tunnelling Company. It was 6 feet high, 3 feet wide and dark apart from air holes left in the roof. The Australians were working at intervals of 30 yards. In the emergency, they were formed into four squads but had limited ammunition. At 6pm there was a lull in the bombardment and advantage was taken to get ammunition and rations from the old HQ and the dressing station which was still standing.
By 6.15 the bombardment started again. At 7.15 a picked division of German marines attacked. At that time half the riflemen had been killed or wounded. Under cover of the guns the marines pushed forward along the sea shore, the tide was very low. Enemy curtain fire made it impossible to guard the beach. The attack was simultaneous from the front and rear (from the beach). First news to reach Battalion HQ was the appearance of the enemy in a communication trench, running parallel to the tunnel. Enemy bombs were thrown down the air holes into the tunnel and the enemy appeared at the west end of the tunnel just as the Australians were getting out of it. Some panic ensued and half the Australians surrendered.
When the surrender had ceased, the Germans threw in 'liquid fire'. Col. Abadie ordered men to sit down, and although the heat was intense, it did no positive harm. The Col. made for the east entrance to make a last charge in the open air, ordering a party to follow him. However the tunnel was narrow and cluttered with men and ammunition boxes and movement was slow, Col Abadie was last seen by the Australians firing his revolver killing five Germans, before he was killed himself. Then the tunnel entrance was blown in.

Officers and men remaining in the tunnel worked to clear the entrance, and decided to join the counter attack they expected from supporting battalions nothing happened. With no hope of escape, should they surrender or sell their lives dearly? Surprisingly, the Germans did not come. When an opening was made it was nearly dark, a reconnoitre showed the party was surrounded by the enemy. A man ventured as far as the old HQ dugout and reported no wounded men British or German. Two officers and a NCO went outside under the cover of a shell hole to within ten yards of a German sentry.
They came to the conclusion that there was a bare chance of escaping back to the Yser. The Germans were busy digging themselves in. The best way was thought to be to divide the party (of four officers, fifteen riflemen and twenty Australians) into sections and leave at intervals of a minute. Codes and military documents were destroyed. When the first section was about to quit, word went round that the Germans were close and were about to enter from that side. Two riflemen were detailed to act as rear guard to delay the enemy, which they did. The whole party evacuated the tunnel and crept past German sentries only 20 yards away. A Very light was thrown up, the sections threw themselves onto the ground to escape notice, the retirement continued.
Despite continuous shell fire the sections nearly reached the bank of the Yser. They found an obstacle in their path - a wooden camouflage screen of a considerable length, 12-14 feet high, set on fire by shells. The Germans were searching the whole area with Very lights. The sections lay down flat to escape notice. The communication trench to the north leading to the now broken floating bridges appeared tempting, but surely the enemy must have occupied that by now. It was decided to move through the screen where it was lowest and afforded something of a gap. The moon began to rise behind them.
The screen was crossed by the nearest section followed by the others at intervals. Some were expert swimmers others less so. Four swam out and reached the remaining portion of a bridge floating in midstream, they stayed for a few minutes. None of the men seemed to follow, but a section was observed to the north crossing a more intact bridge (they had lost sight of the four). That bridge only spanned two thirds of the Yser, and the men had to swim the remainder of the distance. A few were shot or drowned. They then found themselves without gas helmets under fire from gas shells. Fortunately the shelling was light and they survived to join up with the Loyal North Lancs Regiment in support and were hospitably entertained.
To return to the firing line, Col Abadie had reinforced 'C' and 'D' Companies with 'A' Company reserves before he was killed. However conditions were so bad that they were all overwhelmed. The Northants Regiment were overwhelmed in the same way. The Germans captured 404 prisoners including 100 wounded.
A German Minenwerfen unit fired 1,500 shells (each 2501bs) the heaviest bombardment known to that unit. The few British howitzers taking part suffered losses and were being fired by officers at the end of the battle. (1012 German Batteries were firing against 182 of the enemy). About 6pm the following day, a Sgt and 20 Riflemen got clear of a dugout and walked back in broad daylight and crossed the Yser without seeing a German. A few wounded men earlier in the day managed to cross the Yser and return to their lines. In all, four officers and fifty-two NCOs and men got back across the Yser. The walking wounded from the dressing station tried to escape but were unable to do so and returned to the station and were taken prisoner. Out of twenty officers seven were killed, ten wounded. The Germans treated the prisoners well, pleased with their success, not bombastic, but surprised at our lack of artillery support. Nonetheless, there were many German wounded as well.

A message to Field Marshall Lord Grenfell, from the 2nd Battalion of the KRRC, for his telegram of sympathy, read, 'Thank you for your kind telegram, hoping to avenge our comrades' loss at the next opportunity'. The Battalion was again reconstituted and brought up to strength. 'La Revanche' (revenge) was not long delayed, for on the Somme in October 1918 the Riflemen encountered the German marines and completely defeated them.
If it is accepted that CFK was a member of 'B' Company then that pinpoints roughly where he was wounded, the position held by the right hand Company of the 2nd KRRC in the front line. As to the time of his wounding, it would seem that it would have been the morning of the 10th July. He was captured sometime after 7.15pm the same day. Rifleman Dean seems to have helped CFK a great deal on his painful three mile march back through the German lines; without his help it is doubtful whether he would have made it.
CFK's account of being taken prisoner is a more typical story for the survivors of the battle than the official one of escapes to the British lines. There were some 100 wounded among 404 prisoners compared with 56 escapees. The arithmetic - 600 riflemen who went up to the front line, means that 140 riflemen were unaccounted for - probably killed. These are better figures than the earlier reports suggested, considering the terrain and the intensity of the bombardment.
What does defy belief is the incompetence of those in the higher command.
They had been at war for three years yet had not learned some of the basic lessons of military strategy and tactics. British troops were certainly heroes led by donkeys !
Alan J Knight. 25 October 1995.